Pitch Deck Design
Investor deck design and narrative structure, demonstrated here with a purpose-built fictional example — the real client engagement is under a signed NDA.
This is where the real deck used to be. That engagement — an investor deck for a sustainable-packaging startup, built alongside deck work for a real-estate investment fund and a handful of other startups — is covered by a signed NDA, and no slide from it, cropped, blurred, or otherwise, is going up here. That's not a judgement call about how confidential the material looks; there's an executed agreement, and I'd rather have an honest gap in a portfolio than a client wondering why their supposedly private pitch is on my website.
So what's actually on this page
Every slide below is built for a fictional company — Meridian Fiberworks, wheat-straw molded-fiber trays, numbers I made up for the purpose — to demonstrate the same craft the real engagement required, without touching anything a real client said or paid for. Nothing here describes a real business, a real supply chain, or a real regulatory count; each slide says so in its own footnote.
What the slides are arguing
A pitch deck's job is to survive the questions an investor is already forming while you talk. The before/after pair shows the most common failure mode: a capabilities slide with nine features and no message, rebuilt as one claim (cost parity, backed by a number) with room to breathe. The trend slide answers "why is this a problem now" with a six-year climb instead of an adjective like "growing." The supply slide answers "how do I know you actually have this" with a drawn radius and a dot count instead of the word "secured" on its own — the same move the real deck's feedstock slide made, with a different material and a different fictional map.
The practice this sits inside
Deck work is a recurring part of what I do — pitch narrative, slide-by-slide rebuilds, and a set of small CLI tools that audit a deck's structure and flag weak slides before a founder presents it. The materials from this practice sit behind $32M+ closed — $26.7M of syndication equity, plus a fund that closed oversubscribed. I wrote more about why most decks fail on their own terms in this essay.